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The American people are well known for stressing the role 
of individual rights within society. In contrast, emphasis on 
community values or  "groupism" is widely regarded as a 
hallmark of Japanese society. These two contemporary societies 
therefore provide an ideal context in which to explore the tense, 
yet complementary, relationship between individualism and 
communitarianism. This article attempts to deepen our 
understanding of the relationship between these two ideas and 
the problems that result from overemphasizing one at the 
expense of the other. 
In  the United States, individualism seems to be 
emphasized to the extreme. Ironically, the dark side of 
individualism has recently become less visible because of the 
quixotic euphoria being experienced in liberal democracies. 
This euphoria stems partly from recent political upheavals. The 
collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union has helped foster an attitude that liberal 
democracy, which is based on individualism and is epitomized 
by the United States, has triumphed.' However, this attitude 
1. The talk of "the end of history," which Francis Fukuyama has recently 
popularized, is a striking example of this attitude. FRANCIS FUKWAMA, END 
OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN xi (1992). Fukuyama argues "that liberal 
democracy may constitute 'the endpoint of mankind's ideological evolution' and 'the 
final ,form of human government' and as such constituted the 'end of history.' " Id. 
(quoting Francis Fukuyama, The End of History? 16 NAT'L INTEREST, Summer 
1969, at 3). He believes so because "while earlier forms of government were 
characterized by grave defects and irrationalities that led to their eventual collapse, 
liberal democracy was arguably free from such fundamental internal contradictions." 
Id. But he seems to recoil from, or even reject, this bold stance near the end of 
his book when he says: 
' Liberal democracies, in other words, are not self-sufficient: the 
community life on which they depend must ultimately come from a source 
different h m  liberalism itself. The men and women who made up 
American society at  the time of founding of the United States were not 
isolated, rational individuals calculating their self-interest. Rather, they 
were for the most part members of religious communities held together by 
a common moral code and belief in God. . . . But in the long run those 
liberal principles had a corrosive effect on the values predating liberalism 
necessary to sustain strong communities, and thereby on a liberal 
society's ability to be self-sustaining. 
Id. at 326-27 (citations omitted). Here Fukuyama echoes the communitarian 
critique of liberalism which is discussed in the text. See infra part 11. Therefore, 
his standpoint seems to be more elusive than provocative. 
5 171 POVERTY OF RIGHTS-BLIND COMMUNALITY 5 19 
does not reflect s o  much a firm self-conviction that liberal 
democracy truly has "triumphed," as it does an underlying need 
for psychological compensation for the anxiety and frustration 
that liberal democracy has produced. 
Since the 1970s, the American people have become 
painfully aware of the chronic diseases in their society such as 
crime, moral and social decay and inner-city collapse. Many 
serious thinkers have attributed these problems to the inherent 
defects or contradictions of liberalism in its existing form2 In 
the arena of political and legal philosophy, a significant body of 
these critics espouse increased c~mmunitarianism.~ These 
communitarians believe liberalism, both in its libertarian 
version--committed to the free market system-and in its 
egalitarian version-committed to the welfare state and its 
accompanying bureaucracy-is responsible for the erosion of 
families, local communities and other forms of primary human 
associations that traditionally have served as buffers between 
individuals and the state. The communitarians argue that such 
community and local associations are indispensable for the 
cultivation of moral and social responsibility. Critics of modern 
liberal democracy a r e  calling for a shift  towards 
communitarianism; they are calling for more community in the 
'land of  right^."^ 
Alan Ryan criticizes Fukuyama for his incoherent understanding of liberal 
democracies shown in another context, saying that "he does not know what he 
really believes." Alan Ryan, Professor Hegel Goes to Washington, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, 
Mar. 26, 1992, at  7-8. But the truth may be that Fukuyama does not really 
believe what he claims to know. At any rate, his evasiveness exemplifies the fact 
that the current "triumphalism" of liberal democracy is not based on a firm self- 
conviction. 
2. See, e.g., DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM 21- 
22, 54-55, 78-84, 171, 256-58 (1976). Bell, however, believes that it is possible to 
rescue liberalism from the cultural contradictions of capitalism by separating 
political liberalism from economic liberalism and combining the former with the 
idea of the public household. Id. at 277-82. Like Bell, a number of intellectuals 
with liberal sympathies are themselves aware of the crisis of liberalism and the 
need for its philosophical reconstruction. See, e.g., LIBERALS ON LIBERALISM 15-64 
(Alfonso J. Damico ed., 1986); NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, ANOTHER LIBERALISM: 
ROMANTICISM AND THE RECONSTRUCTION F LIBERAL THOUGHT (1987). 
3. For the gist of the polemics and bibliographical information, see 
COMMUNITARIANISM AND INDMDUALISM (Shlomo Avineri & Avner de-Shalit eds. 
1992); LAW AND THE COMMUNITY: THE END OF INDIVIDUALISM? (A.C. Hutchinson & 
L.J.M. Green eds., 1989); LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984) 
[hereinafter LIBERALISM]; LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE (Nancy L. Rosenblum 
ed., 1989); STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SWIET, LIBERALS AND COMMUNITARIANS 
(1992). 
4. As far as I know, the first person to use the phrase Yand of rights" is 
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In  Japan, the opposite problem exists-a hypertechnical 
communitarianism has exacted a heavy toll on the people, 
while it has contributed to the postwar resurgence and success 
of the country. This article will explore some glaring aspects of 
this dilemma of communitarianism. Particular attention will be 
drawn to kaishashugi, which is a communitarian reconstruction 
of capitalism prevalent in Japan. It exemplifies how the 
communal identity can enhance people's productivity and yet 
impovefish their lives. A devastating side effect of its 
prevalence is karoshi, meaning literally death from overwork, 
which deftly symbolizes the dilemma inherent in Japan's 
emphasis on communitarianism. The lesson learned from these 
and other related phenomena is that Japan must seek a more 
balanced approach in accommodating the tension between 
communitarianism and individualism. In other words, there is 
a great need for more emphasis on individual rights in what 
might be referred to as the land of community. 
This article discusses how Japanese society can benefit by 
placing a stronger emphasis on individual rights and how the 
Japanese experience can shed light on issues raised by the 
current liberal-communitarian debate. In order to set the 
Japanese dilemma in vivid relief against the background of this 
debate, part I1 begins by briefly surveying the current 
intellectual movement in the United States called communitar- 
ianism. The thrust of part I1 is to illustrate several theories 
that try to reconstruct the American Society so that it will 
foster greater community values and thereby avoid the dangers 
of excessive individualism. With this understanding of the 
communitar ian movement, p a r t  I11 describes t h e  
communitarian character of contemporary Japanese society by 
looking at kaishashugi, a unique feature of communality in 
modern Japan. Part I11 also discusses a troubling problem 
caused by the dark side of communitarianism-karoshi. 
Discussing kroshi  and other examples of the tyranny of 
intermediary communities in Japan, part I11 argues that Japan 
needs to reorient5 its society so as to take individual rights 
more seriously. Finally, by reconsidering the relationship 
between individual rights and the multiplicity of our communal 
responsibilities, part IV argues that such a reorientation would 
Mary AM Glendon. See MARY A. GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF 
POLITICAT. DISCOURSE 1 (1991). 
5. No pun intended. 
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enrich Japan's communal life because an adequate form of 
individualism is an indispensable basis for open communality. 
The United States is a land of individuality and individual 
rights. Individual liberties and freedoms have become the over- 
arching concern of the American legal system. Communitarians 
are now objecting that America has become so polarized on 
individualism as to be crippled by social ills. While the focus of 
this paper is not on America's social ills, some brief remarks 
are appropriate on the current comrnunitarian movement in 
the United States and how it argues for increased community 
in this land of rights. 
A. Four Current Viewpoints of Communitarianism 
Communitarians are all motivated by the practical need 
they see to rehabilitate or strengthen community-based moral 
and social values. But their theories involve differences in fo- 
cus, of course, and as a whole constitute more of an intellectual 
alliance with family resemblances rather than a unitary ideolo- 
gy. Thus, it is difficult to formulate the ideas of 
communitariarism in any systematic way. Generally speaking, 
however, communitarians share all or some of the following 
four viewpoints. 
1. Conventionalist meta-ethics 
One viewpoint of communitarianism may be referred to as 
conventionalist meta-ethics. The central thesis of this theory is 
that moral and political values are the conventions or common 
understandings developed through the particular history and 
traditions of a given political community. There are no indepen- 
dent external grounds from which to criticize a community's 
practices. Political communities are only capable of internal or 
connected criticism based on their own traditions. Thus, the 
principles of human rights to which liberals are committed 
cannot claim universal validity. Moreover, these principles are 
too abstract to give effective and substantial guidance regard- 
ing the problems of political m~ra l i ty .~  
6. See generally ALA~DAIR WCINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL 
THEORY 126-27, 221-23, 268-69, 272-78 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinaibr W I N T Y R E ,  AF- 
TER VIRTUE]; ALASDAIR MACINTIRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONAL~~Y? 7-11, 
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2. Anti-atomist anthropology 
Communitarians characterize liberalism as atomistic in its 
conception of human self and agency. In other words, liberals 
are said to assume that an individual's self-identity is consti- 
tuted by her ability to choose her ends, not by any of the ends 
and values shared in the community to  which she belongs. The 
second viewpoint of communitarianism, which I call anti-atom- 
ist anthropology, asserts that this atomistic conception of hu- 
mans is false. 
Anti-atomist anthropology holds that humans are social 
animals, not separate atomistic beings completely independent 
of one another. Moreover, individuals who are unencumbered 
by community values are far from autonomous because they 
lack any deeply internalized values necessary to make reflec- 
tive choices. The moral depth and rich self-knowledge that 
empower human agency can only be enjoyed by the situated 
selves whose identity is partially constituted by shared ends 
embedded in the common history or narratives of their commu- 
3. Politics of the common good 
A third communitarian viewpoint stresses that politics 
should promote the common good. The aim of politics and law 
is to promote the community's pursuit of its common conception 
of the good life, rather than to protect individuals' rights to 
form and live by their own conceptions. Politics and law can 
and should endeavor to make people virtuous as defined by this 
common conception. It is not enough to assure that people are 
fair or just in the sense that they refrain from violating other 
people's rights. The key tenets of deontological liberalism-the 
primacy of justice over the good and the concept of individual 
rights as trumps or side-constraints over collective goals-must 
389-403 (1988) [hereinafkr MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?]; MICHAEL WALZER, INTER- 
PRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM (1987) [hereinaRer WALZER, INTERPRETATION]; 
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 
xiv-w, 312-16 (1983) [hereinafter WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE]; Charles Taylor, 
The Nature and Scope of Distributive Justice, in 2 PHIL. PAPERS 289-303 (1985). 
7. MACINTYRE, AFPER VIRTUE, supra note 6, at 216-21; MICHAEL J. SANDEL, 
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 15-65, 147-83 (1982); Charles Taylor, At- 
omism, in COMMUNITARIANISM AND INDIVIDUALISM, supra note 3, at 29; CHARLES 
TAYLOR, HEGEL AND MODERN SOCIETY 154-66 (1979) [hereinafter TAYLOR, MODERN 
SOCIETY]. 
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be rejected so that the community can use its regulating power 
to restrict individual rights in favor of collective goals and, if 
necessary, to  interfere with the morality of indi~iduals.~ 
4. Civic republicanism 
A fourth viewpoint of communitarianism is the need for 
society to strengthen its adherence to civic republicanism. Civic 
republicanism stands for the idea that society must develop 
civic virtue in order to advance the common good. Civic virtue 
consists of the individual's ability and willingness to actively 
participate in the public affairs of his own community. Liberals 
favor a centralized representative government constrained by 
judicial review, but this system has protected the private inter- 
ests and negative liberty of individuals a t  the cost of spreading 
political apathy and public irresponsibility. What is needed to 
cultivate or rehabilitate civic virtue is to revitalize the self- 
ruling practices of local communities and other intermediary 
institutions which can function as the primary schools of par- 
ticipatory demo~racy.~ 
B. Attempts to Strengthen the Communitarian 
Movement in America 
The four viewpoints summarized above are closely interre- 
lated, but no logically necessary connections exist between 
them. In fact, a potential tension exists between the conserva- 
tive, tradition-based tenets of the first and second viewpoints 
on the one hand, and the theme of radical participatory democ- 
racy underlying the fourth viewpoint on the other. For exam- 
8. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 6, a t  244-55; SANDEL, supra note 7, 
at 179-83; LIBERALISM, supra note 3, a t  6-7; Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument 
and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and H o m o s d i t y ,  77 CAL. L. REV. 521, 521-38 
(1989); Michael J. Sandel, Morality and the Liberal Ideal, NEW REPUBLIC, May 7, 
1984, at  17. 
9. See generally BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY 
POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE (1984); ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE 
HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985); J.G.A. POCOCK, 
THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: nORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC 
REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); Michael J. Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the 
Unencumbered Self, in COMMUNITARIANISM AND INDIVIDUALISM, supra note 3, at  24- 
28; Charles Taylor, Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate, in LIBERAL- 
ISM AND THE MORAL LIFE, supra note 3, at 159-82; Charles Taylor, Rant's w r y  
of Freedom, in 2 PHIL. PAPERS, supra note 6, a t  318-37. For discussions on civic 
republicanism, see Civic Republicanism and Its Critics, 14 POL. THEORY 423-93 
(1986). 
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ple, one commentator has discussed this potential conflict by 
juxtaposing the traditionalist version of communitarianism, 
which he calls unitary democracy, with a radical participatory 
democracy, which he calls strong democracy.1° While the for- 
mer regards community consensus as a preexistent collective 
entity, the latter places great emphasis on creating a communi- 
ty consensus through a transformative participatory process. 
One way to relax this tension is to regard the quest for 
civic virtue itself as a fundamental value inherent in the 
shared tradition. Such a formulation essentially equates with a 
republican reinterpretation of American constitutional histo- 
ry.'' The tension may also be relaxed by holding that partici- 
patory democracy requires some shared traditions as the com- 
mon ground for consensus formation to restrain its own disinte- 
grative tendency.12 
One can discern, however, a common theme underlying the 
four viewpoints of communitarianism. This common theme may 
be described as an attempt to shift the community's focus from 
abstract individual rights to the concrete common good. It is a 
movement away from disempowered autonomy of rootless indi- 
viduals and toward a common flourishing of human agency 
realized in a community where people share memories and 
jointly venture to shape their common futures in their own 
way. 
A parallel intellectual movement can be seen in develop- 
mental psychology. The dominant model of human moral devel- 
opment constructed on the Piaget-Kohlberg lines regards indi- 
vidual autonomy and universalism of equal rights as the acme 
of moral maturity.13 Criticizing this model, Carol Gilligan 
presents an alternative model in a context specifically aimed at 
women, but applicable to society at large.14 She believes that 
her model can illuminate the complexity and richness of those 
10. BARBER, supra note 9, at 148-62, 242-51. See also Barber's criticism of 
MacIntyre in BENJAMIN R. BARBER, TIIE CONQUEST OF POLITICS: LIBERAL PHILOSO- 
PHY IN DEMOCRATIC TIMES 177-92 (1988). 
11. See genemUy BERNARD BAILYN, T m  IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (1967); POCOCK, supra note 9; GORDON S. WOOD, rn CREATION OF 
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969). For recent discussions on the subject, 
see Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493-723 (1988). 
12. T A ~ R ,  MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 7, at 115. 
13. See generally LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOP- 
MENT (1981); JEAN PIAGET, T'Hli! MORAL JUDGMENT OF A CHILD (1932). 
14. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND 
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982). 
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dimensions of women's moral experiences which she thinks the 
dominant model has distorted as a sign of women's moral im- 
maturity. 
Gilligan presents a conception of morality that she calls 
"an ethic of care," in contrast to "an ethic of rights," which she 
characterizes as the dominant model.15 An ethic of care ac- 
cepts interdependence, connection and attachment as  the pri- 
mary human conditions; an ethic of rights assumes that inde- 
pendence, separation and self-sufficiency are the basic condi- 
tions for individual security and self-fulfillment.16 
Other important differences derive from this fundamental 
difference between the two conceptions of morality. For exam- 
ple, the cardinal value in an ethic of care is the responsibility 
of caring, or sensitivity and responsiveness to concrete human 
needs, which enables us to strengthen human relationships. In 
contrast, an ethic of rights gives primacy to the universal prin- 
ciples of justice, which require us to respect the equal rights of 
all individuals and to balance those rights in a fair and imper- 
sonal way.'' 
Consequently, an ethic of care considers conflicting respon- 
sibilities to be the most pressing moral dilemma, requiring for 
its resolution a contextual and narrative mode of moral deliber- 
ation-a mode of thinking sensitive to the contingencies and 
contextual particularity of each conflict situation.18 An ethic of 
rights, on the other hand, interprets moral problems as a con- 
flict of rights, and requires us to solve them by a formal, ab- 
stract mode of thinking which "divest[s] moral actors from the 
history and psychology of their individual lives and separate[sl 
the moral problem from the social contingencies of its possible 
~ccurrence."~~ 
Whether we can generalize the association of the gender 
difference with this contrast between the two conceptions of 
morality is certainly a debatable empirical question. However, 
it is not Gilligan's purpose to make this generalization. As she 
says, "The different voice I describe is characterized not by 
gender but by theme."20 Her aim is to make all people, espe- 
15. Id. at 19. 
16. Id. at 24-63. 
17. Id. at 16-22, 27-38, 54, 73-74, 164-67. 
18. Id. at 19. 
19. Id. at 100. 
20. Id. at 2. 
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cially Americans, listen more attentively and sympathetically 
to this different voice-the voice of care-which she thinks has 
been overpowered by the louder voice of rights. The issue is the 
message of this different voice, not the gender of the utterer. 
Gilligan's ideas have not only widened the horizons of 
feminism, but have also reinforced the communitarian move- 
ment and greatly enriched its content and vocabulary. To fully 
comprehend the prerequisites of communal relationships, one 
must first grasp Gilligan's concept of mutual care, which is not 
completely reducible to participation in the pursuit of what the 
community deems "the good life." 
The communitarian vision also finds an eloquent jurispru- 
dential expression in Mary Ann Glendon's recent work, Rights 
Talke2' In this work, she elaborately traces and criticizes the 
development, in various American legal contexts, of what she 
considers to be an impoverished version of rights talk. 
Glendon's aim is "not the abandonment, but the renewal, 
of our strong rights tradition."22 Nevertheless, she clearly 
shares the communitarian viewpoint when she criticizes the 
"dominant version" of rights talk in the contemporary American 
liberal democracy for "its starkness and simplicity, its prodigal- 
ity in bestowing the rights label, its legalistic character, its 
exaggerated absoluteness, its hyperindividualism, its insulari- 
ty, and its silence with respect to personal, civic, and collective 
resp~nsibilities."~~ 
Her communitarian sympathy is even clearer when she 
looks to the American "indigenous languages of relationship 
and responsibility" as sources for renewing political dis- 
course.24 These 'languages" have their own "grammar of coop- 
erative living" reserved in the "varied communities of memory 
and mutual aid," that are, "the seedbeds of civic virtue" like 
"families, religious communities and other primary groups," 
which she urges people t o  revitali~e.~' 
The preceding section has given only a skeletal description 
of the communitarian movement now conspicuous in the Amer- 
ican intellectual landscape. Hopefully, this discussion has made 
21. GLENDON, supra note 4. 
22. Id. at xii. 
23.  Id. at x. 
24. Id. at xii. 
25. See id. at xii-xiii. 
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audible the voice calling for community in the country which 
Glendon calls "the land of rights."26 
111. THE CALL FOR RIGHTS IN A LAND OF COMMUNITY 
A. Communitarianism and Kaishashugi 
in  Contemporary Japan 
The communitarian vision described above has an affmity 
to what many consider to be the Japanese outlook on human 
life and morality. This a f h i t y  is manifest in at least four char- 
acteristics deemed salient in Japanese culture and society. 
First, the primacy of group loyalty, said to be a basic feature of 
the Japanese mind, results in a weak commitment to such 
universal principles as human rights, justice, and fair- 
ness-principles that theoretically do not discriminate between 
insiders and outsiders.27 Some Western observers even view 
this focus on group loyalty as a root cause of the current fric- 
tion between Japan and Western countries.28 In this regard, it 
may be noted that cultural and contextual relativism (as im- 
plied by communitarian meta-ethics) is popular in Japan and is 
sometimes relied on to defend "the uniqueness" or "the particu- 
larity" of Japanese society against Western criticism based on 
universalist p r in~ ip le s .~~  
Second, the Japanese group orientation not only deter- 
mines individual preferences, but also penetrates individual 
self-identity. To put it in the communitarian language, indi- 
viduals in contemporary Japan are, despite increased social 
mobility, still far more apt to be "situated selves" rather than 
"unencumbered selves."30 An important type of group that cur- 
rently attracts Japanese loyalty and helps provide self-identity 
is the h i s h a  or business c~rporation.~' The fact that a person 
is working for Nissan, for example, is not just information 
26. Id at 1. 
27. See, eg., CHIE NAKANE, JAPANESE SOCIETY (1973). 
28. See, e.g., James Fallows, Containing Japan, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1989, 
at 40-54; KAREL. VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER: PEOPLE AND 
POWCS IN A STATELESS NATION 8-11, 202-94 (1989). 
29. VAN WOLFEREN, supm note 28, at 245-48, 293. 
30. For the contrast between the two types of selves, see supm part IIA.2. 
31. In fact, in discussions about dominant human character types the term 
hisha ningen is used to signify a corporate person. See, e.g., Shigeru Komago, 
Kigyojin hem Tegami [Letters to Corporate People], NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, Jan. 8, 
1992, at 1; Minoru Tabata, 'Kaishashugi' no Kiki no Genshogaku [Phenomenology of 
the Crisis of the Company-Cult], 12 &&DO, Summer 1992, at 43-55. 
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about his job, but is usually a dominant part of who he is. A 
person's job is a vital source of his self-respect, a firm basis for 
his self-interpretation, and a prime determinant of the social 
recognition he gains. 
Third, the Japanese indigenous moral language places 
special emphasis on the primacy of collective goals over private 
interests, common good over individual rights, and civic respon- 
sibility to engage in public affairs over personal freedom and 
privacy. The term symbolizing this primacy is messhi hoko, 
which means the virtue of sacrificing one's private life to public 
service, or  more literally, self-annihilation in the service of 
public interests. 
The phrase itself is now unpopular because it was 
rampantly used or abused for purposes of military mobilization 
in World War 11. But as will be shown below in connection with 
k ~ r o s h i ? ~  a postwar social equivalent of messhi hoko still ex- 
ists in the way contemporary Japanese employees devotedly 
sacrifice themselves to  their companies (kaisha) so as  to be 
called kigyo senshi, o r  corporate warriors.33 For a devoted 
kigyo senshi, the kaisha is not just a private business entity 
with which he has a contractual relationship, but a public or 
quasi-public space in his world which overwhelms other public 
spheres in importance. A corporate warrior would not hesitate 
to say he is rendering his hoko (public service) to his kaisha. 
Finally, the vagueness of self-other differentiation, which 
implies the importance of human interdependence (anme), 
connection (en) and the mutual responsibility of caring 
(kikubari), is often ascribed to the core of the Japanese view of 
the moral world. On the other hand, individual autonomy and 
rights consciousness (kenri ishiki), which presuppose a sharp 
self-other differentiation, are regarded as alien to this view.34 
32. See infra part 1II.B. 
33. The term "corporate warrior" is used, for example, in the title of a book in 
English on kamshi published by a group of Japanese lawyers, researchers (who 
specialize in economics, medicine and labor problems) and wives of Itamshi victims. 
NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNSEL FOR VICTIMS OF KAROSHI, KAROSHI: WHEN THE TOR- 
PORATE WARRIOR" DIES (1990) [hereinafter KAROSHI]. 
34. TAKEO DOI, THE ANATOMY OF DEPENDENCE (John Bester trans., 1977); 
E s m  HAMAGUCHI, KANJINSWGI NO SHAKAI NIHON [JAPAN AS A C O N T ~ A L I S T  
SOCIETY] (1982); E m  HAMAGUCHI, NIHONRASHISA NO SAIHAKKEN [JAPANESENESS 
REDISCOVERED] (1988); TAKEYOSHI KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN O HO-ISHIKI [LEGAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE JAPANESE] (1967). For a recent discussion on the subject in 
the context of a philosophical reexamination of the concept of legal person, see 
Stephen C. Hicks, On the Citizen and the Legal Person: Toward the Common 
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In short, the moral world where the Japanese are said to live is 
very much like Gilligan's concept of an ethic of care. 
Whether this picture of the Japanese moral world is more 
of an ideological fiction than a description of reality is debat- 
able.35 I believe it is as much ideological as real. At any rate, 
it is more or less self-fulfillingy influencing the Japanese in  
shaping their moral self-understanding. Many Japanese, if 
informed of Gilligan's work,s6 would certainly think that she 
is describing Japan's own moral voice when she speaks in 
terms of an ethic of care. I . .  fact, a Japanese developmental 
psychologist reported, based on empirical data, that the relative 
importance of the mother-child relationship (as compared with 
the father-child relationship) in the upbringing of Japanese 
children tended to render the moral development of the Japa- 
nese better fitted to  Gilligan's model than to Kohlberg's." 
The foregoing discussion has compared the communitarian 
vision emerging in the United States with the characteristically 
Japanese mode of human existence and moral life to show the 
affinity between the two. However, the preceding treatment of 
kaishu as an important form of constitutive community may 
surprise or perplex those contemporary communitarian Ameri- 
cans who tend to regard business corporations as enemies to 
traditional communitarianism. A few more words about the 
character of Japanese corporations are therefore required. 
Ground of Jurisprudence, Social Theory, and Comparative Law as the Premise of a 
Future Community, and the Role of the Self Therein, 59 U .  CM. L. REV. 789, 821- 
30 (1991). 
35. For recent discussions on the question of whether Japanese society is, and 
will be, non-individualistic, see KOJIN, KANJIN, NIHONJIN: JAPANOMGY 0 KOETE 
[THE INDIVIDUAL, THE CONTEXTUAL AND THE JAPANESE: BEYOND JAPANOLOGY] (Ross 
Mouer & Yoshio Sugirnoto eds., 1987); RONALD P. DORE, WILL THE 21ST CENTURY 
WORLD BE THE AGE OF INDIVIDUALISM? 42-117 (1991). In this connection, it may 
be noted that some Japanese and Western scholars have been critically reexamin- 
ing the supposed non-litigious character of the Japanese which Kawashima come&- 
ed with the weakness of rightsconsciousness in Japan in his standard work. 
KAWASHW, supra note 34. Cf. WSAO O m ,  NIHONJIN NO Ho-KANNEN: SENOTEKI 
Ho-KANNEN TON0 HIKAKU [THE JAPANESE NOTION OF LAW: A COMPARISON WITH 
THE &XXDENTAL NOTION OF LAW] (1983); JOHN 0. HALEY, AUTHORITY WlTHOT 
POWER: LAW UD. THE JAPANESE PARADOX 83-116 (1991). Skepticism about the 
alleged Japanese nonlitigiousness, however, does not necessarily imply the view 
that Japan is an individualistic society. For example, Haley holds that the absence 
of aversion to litigation is compatible with Japanese society. Id. See also infra note 
86. 
36. See supra part 1I.B. 
37. Akiko Yamagishi, Futatsu no Dotolulsei to Taijin Kankei [Two Moralities 
and Interpersonal Relations], 1 JUNTENDO IRYO TANKIDAIGAKU TYO 48-55 (1990). 
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A variety of factors give a communal character to Japanese 
 corporation^.^^ The so-called three sacred regalia of Japanese 
labor-management relations, which consist of lifetime employ- 
ment, promotion by seniority, and in-company labor unions 
based on the capital-labor conciliation policy, have undeniably 
strengthened the identification of employees with their compa- 
nies. A penetrating analysis has recently been presented by 
scholars who use the concept of kaishashugi, a new term coined 
by combining kaisha and shugi (ism), to characterize Japanese 
labor-management  relation^.^' Kaishashugi also refers to the 
entire Japanese social system because that system is strongly 
influenced by the economic structure based on labor-manage- 
ment  relation^.^' 
Koji Baba, a leading analyst of kaishashugi, formulates the 
concept of kaishashugi by combining these three sacred regalia 
with the following four features: 1) sharing of membership and 
control of kaisha by labor and management to the exclusion of 
stockholders, and the homogenization of labor and management 
by recruiting management from labor; 2) limited and invisible 
inequality of wages and management participation among the 
employees, which makes their communal solidarity and com- 
petitive motivations compatible; 3) close cooperation, constant 
communication, and absence of class distinctions between blue- 
collar and white-collar workers; and 4) long-term business 
relations between corporations, which help bring about commu- 
nal relationships at the intercorporate leveL4' In sum, Baba 
says, "kaishashugi is an exquisite combination of the capitalis- 
tic competition with the communal or socialistic  relation^.'"'^ 
He observes that kaishashugi has made contemporary Japan a 
country where "the stockholders' control of corporations is too 
weak for us to find the Big Capitalists; the income differentials 
38. This article merely presents some of those factors without taking sides in 
the controversy about whether they are culturally, politically or economically de- 
termined. 
39. !he term kuishashugi has no English equivalent. 
40. See, e.g., 1 GENDAI NIHON SHAKAI [THE CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE SOCIETY] 
chs. 4-6 (Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo ed., 1991-92); OSAMU 
WATANABE, nGY0 SHIHAI M KOKKA [THE CORPORATE DOMINANCE AND THE STATE] 
(1991); HIROSHI ~ ~ R A ,  HOJIN SHIHONSHUGI NO KOZO [W STRUCTURE OF THE 
CORPORATE CAPITALISM] (rev. ed., 1990). 
41. Koji Baba, Gendrri Sekui to Nihon Kaishashugi [The Contemporary World 
and the Raishashugi in Japan], in 1 GENDAI NIHON SHAKAI, supra note 40, at 29- 
83. 
42. Id. at 71. 
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are generally small; there is little class distinction in  wages or 
work conditions; there is workers' 'participation7 in manage- 
ment; on the whole it is difficult to find class differences.'"13 
As a Marxist economist, Baba is not completely happy with 
the prevalence of kaishashugi. He adds, in an ambivalent tone: 
[Ulnder the rule of kaishashugi, workers are dealt with as 
shutai [self-ruling agents as opposed to the objects of control 
to which "the alienated laborers" in the classical sense were 
reduced], or rather they are coerced to be shutai both by the 
competitive and communal elements, ending up pursuing 
their self-development only in the direction of improving their 
productivity for the sake of kaisha as the capital.44 
Despite its ultramodern economy, Japan has preserved its 
community-oriented character. In fact, as the prevalence of 
kaishashugi shows, Japan's communal character has contribut- 
ed to its tremendous economic growth. The economic growth of 
postwar Japanese society has, in turn, caused Japan to repro- 
duce or even reinforce its community-oriented character. 
Although the leading Japanese intellectuals involved in the 
postwar enlightenment movement, who were called 
kindaishugisha (modernists), urged people to accept individual- 
istic valuesP5 Japanese society continued to be a land of com- 
munity in its basic structure. Ironically enough, the communal 
traits of Japanese society which those modernist intellectuals 
regarded as signs of its "backwardness" closely resemble the 
communitarian alternative now emerging in the land of rights, 
the United States, which epitomizes modernity. 
Does all of this mean that it is time for Americans to learn 
from the Japanese? The answer is both yes and no. Yes, be- 
cause there is something to learn from Japanese experiences. 
No, because the lesson Japan can offer is anything but "do as 
we do." The dark side of Japan's land of community is at least 
as dark as the dark side of America's land of rights. As for 
Japan, there is now an urgent need to heed the voice that calls 
for increased respect for individual rights. 
43. Id. at 64. 
44. Id. at 74. The inserted explanation in brackets of the meaning of shutai, a 
Japanese equivalent of the German word das Subjekt in its philosophical use, is 
based on Baba's passage just preceding the quoted one. Baba also warns that the 
hyperproductivity of kaishashugi will sustain excessive mass consumption societies 
and thereby aggravate environmental disruption and other social ills. Id. at 77-83. 
45. See, eg., DORE, supra note 35, at 62-65. 
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B. The Dark Side of Japanese Communality: 
Karoshi as Symbolic Death 
The way people die sometimes discloses the dilemma or 
contradictions inherent in their form of social life. This kind of 
death may be referred to as a symbolic death. Emile Durkheim 
gave a classical example of the analysis of symbolic death in 
his extensive work, S~icide.4~ He explained that "egoistic sui- 
cide" and "anomic suicide" derive from the individualistic form 
of social life. When communal cohesion is loosened, individuals 
are exposed to two great dangers: first, ceasing to find anything 
meaningful or  valuable for which to live; and second, losing the 
ability t o  control one's desires and frustrations, and thereby 
losing one's psychological stability. The first danger makes 
individuals vulnerable to egoistic suicide, the second to anomic 
sui~ide.~' On the other hand, altruistic suicide results from 
the collectivistic form of social life which minimizes the value of 
individual lives by merging them into a collective entity.48 
By exploring this idea of symbolic death, one discovers a 
revealing example of the dark side of Japanese communality. 
This is because contemporary Japanese society has its own 
kind of symbolic death, although it is different from any of the 
types of suicide Durkheim discussed. This symbolic death is 
called karoshi, or death from 0verwork.4~ 
Karoshi seizes workers in the form of brain hemorrhage, 
heart failure, cerebral or myocardial infarction and the like, as 
the cumulative effect of extended overwork (habitualized long 
overtime and few days off). Among the other causal factors are 
exhausting commuting conditions and the psychological and 
physiological stress of job transfers unaccompanied by one's 
family (tanshin funin).50 Karoshi victims do not kill them- 
selves-they "burn away." 
The exact frequency of karoshi is difficult t o  determine 
because of insuEcient data and the difficulty of proving causal 
connections. However, it is certainly not uncommon, as is evi- 
46. E m  DURKHEIM, SUICIDE: A SlvDy IN SOCIOLOGY (George Simpson ed. & 
John A. Spaulding trans., 1951). 
47. Id. at 152-216, 241-76. 
48. Id. at 217-41. 
49. To date, the most detailed English publication on krrroshi is KAROSHI, supra 
note 33, which examines the complex problem of kamshi in its social, legal, eco- 
nomic and medical aspects. 
50. Id. at 8-10, 98-102. 
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denced by the Karoshi Hotlines, a voluntary consultation-by- 
phone service program. When a group of Japanese lawyers and 
doctors opened the Karoshi Hotlines in seven major cities on 
June 18, 1988, they received 135 calls from the family and 
relatives of karoshi victims on the first day alone. During the 
following two years, they handled 1806 cases.51 
Karoshi has become a serious social issue in Japan not 
only because the reported cases have been increasing in num- 
ber, but also because the way karoshi victims die represents 
the difficult living conditions shared by ordinary people. Ac- 
cording to a 1991 survey, one out of five (and one out of four 
male) office workers in Tokyo fear that they may suffer 
karo~hi.'~ Moreover karoshi is a classless death. It can happen 
to anyone irrespective of age, sex, occupation, or post. For ex- 
ample, directors and managers constituted about fifteen per- 
cent of the karoshi victims in the 1806 cases handled by the 
Karoshi hot line^.^' The fact that the sense of vulnerability to  
karoshi is widely shared seems to reveal more about Japanese 
society than its actual frequency does. This fact is part of the 
reason why karoshi can be called a symbolic death. 
A human dimension of karoshi is poignantly expressed in a 
note left by Toshitsugu Yagi, a karoshi victim who, until his 
death, rarely returned home from work before midnight. He 
died in 1987 from a myocardial infarction at the age of forty- 
three.54 In his note, Yagi likened "today's armies of corporate 
workers" on their "daily commuter trains packed to overflow- 
ing" to the "slaves [who] were loaded onto slave ships and car- 
ried off to the new Yagi concluded that today's corpo- 
rate warriors are more miserable than slaves were because 
"corporate slaves . . . don't even share the simplest of pleasures 
51. Id. at 7. 
52. Toshin ni Hatarah OL: Sarariman no Rknko Chosa [Health Survey of the 
m e  Workers in Tokyo], ASAHI SHINBUN, June 2, 1992, at 26 (quoting the survey 
of working conditions of office workers in Tokyo conducted by Chuo Rosei Jimusho 
(the Tokyo metropolitan central office for labor administration) in Odober and 
November, 1991) [hereinafter Health Survey]. This survey gives a relatively conser- 
vative estimate. Another survey reports that 48% of the questioned workers replied 
that they felt "anxiety about karoshi." Kishio Hobara, Rodojikansei no Arikata 
[What the Working Hours ReguLation Is and Should Be Lih], J U R I ~ ,  May 1, 
1992, at 261 (quoting a newspaper article in Yam Smm, Feb. 13, 1992). 
53. KARosHI, supra note 33, at i. 
54. For a detailed description of the conditions of life for Yagi and his family 
before and after his death, see id. at 37-46. 
55. Id. at 4. 
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that those forced laborers of ages past enjoyed: the right to sit 
down a t  the dinner table with their families."56 If nothing 
else, Yagi's note should "inform people around the world about 
potential hazards contained in Japanese-style management and 
serious distortions underlying the Japanese economy."57 
In the preface to the English report on karoshi, published 
by the National Defense Counsel for Victims of Karoshi, the 
authors proclaim: 
It is said that all human rights are based on respect for the 
individual. We believe that the freedom of an individual to 
live and die naturally without being subjected to destruction 
by others is the foundation of all human rights. We therefore 
believe that conditions and practices which destroy workers' 
health and life should never be t~lerated.~' 
This is a forcible call for individual rights. So far, however, the 
legal response to the issues it raises has been insufficient or 
even nonexistent in Japan. 
Part of the problem results from Japan's lack of effective 
regulations. Although the Labor Stand&& Law stipulates that 
the maximum working hours should be forty hours per 
week,59 this is nothing more than a shabby facade because the 
same law allows the Cabinet t o  extend the limit up to forty- 
eight hours by its ordinance.60 Since 1991, the limit set by the 
ordinance has been forty-four hours per week. The law is fur- 
ther diluted by a provision6' authorizing the employer and the 
labor union composed of the majority of the employees (or other 
employee representatives) to raise the legal limit by agreement, 
the so-called saburoku kyotei (the three-six agreement).62 
In 1991, the Ministry of Labor developed an administrative 
guidance plan to reduce overtime. The Plan did not make much 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 111. 
58. Id. at IV. 
59. RODOKLTLTNHO [Labor Standards Law] art. 32 (Japan) (Law No. 99 of 1987). 
R5d6kijunh6 [hereinafter ROIUHO] was originally enacted in 1947. The statute in its 
current form includes many amendments made on various occasions since then. 
60. Id. art 131 ¶ 1. 
61. Id. art. 36. 
62. KAROSHI, supra note 33, at 85-86; Koichiro Yamaguchi, Rodokijunho 
Minaoshi no Ronten [The Labor Standards Law Reconsidered: Main Issues], 
JURISUTO, Apr. 1, 1992, at 43-44; Seigo Mori, Jikangai Rodo no Sakugen to Hoteki 
Kisei [The Curtailment of Overtime Work and the Legal R~gulationsl, JURISUTO, 
Apr. 1, 1992, at 58-63. 
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sense, however, because the suggested limit on overtime was 
450 to 780 hours per year, and work on holidays was disregard- 
ed.63 Thus, there is no mandatory legal limit to maximum 
working hours, except for certain highly dangerous occupa- 
t i o n ~ , ~ ~  female w0rkers,6~ and minors.66 
Other provisions of the Labor Standards Law also fail to 
discourage excessive overtime. The premium rate for overtime 
required by the Labor Standards Law is only twenty-five per- 
too low to motivate management to hire additional em- 
ployees instead of relying on overtime work. As for vacation, 
the law entitles workers to ten to twenty paid holidays per 
year, depending on the length of employment,6' but there is 
no provision about the minimum number of holidays to  be 
actually taken. On average, Japanese workers take only half 
the paid holidays to  which they are entitled.69 Finally, en- 
forcement of the law is so ineffective that the so-called sabisu 
zangyo (free service overtime which is unrecorded and unpaid) 
is a normal pra~tice.~' 
The Japanese courts have also refused to curb overtime 
abuses. In 1991, the Japanese Supreme Court ruled in Tanaka 
v. Hitachi, Inc7l that an individual worker has no right to  re- 
fuse an employer's request for overtime if the time does not 
exceed the limit agreed upon by the employer and the union. 
The court upheld the employer's disciplinary measure of dis- 
missing the plaintiff who refused such requests. The saburoku 
kyotei (the three-six agreement) involved in Tanaka included, 
among its conditions for acceptable overtime, such all-embrac- 
ing and unrestrained language as "the necessity of working 
overtime to attain production goals." The Japanese Supreme 
Court acknowledged the agreement's comprehensiveness but 
63. Yamaguchi, supra note 62, at 45-46. 
64. ROKIHO art. 36, proviso (Japan) (Law No. 99 of 1987). 
65. Id. art. 64, 1 2 (Law No. 45 of 1985). 
66. Id. art. 60 (Law No. 99 of 1987). 
67. Id. art. 37 (Law No. 49 of 1947). 
68. Id. art. 39, 91 1-6 (Law No. 99 of 1987). 
69. See Susumu Noda, Magarikado ni Kita Nenkyu Hori: 'Jitan Sokushin' no 
Nakade [Vacation Law at the Crossroads: Under the Working Hours Curtailment 
Drive'], JURISUM, Apr. 1, 1992, at 49. 
70. Mori, supra note 62, at 59, 63; KAROSHI, supra note 33, at 66-67, 87-88. 
71. Judgment of Nov. 28, 1991, Saik6sai Daiichi Shohotei [Supreme Court, 1st 
Petty Bench] 774 HANTA 73 (Japan). 
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held that it was reasonable and that it met the purpose of 
Article 36 of the Labor Standards Law.72 
The situation is no better in terms of workers' compensa- 
tion benefits. Karoshi victims are rarely compensated under the 
current workers' compensation insurance system because the 
restrictive coverage formula set by the Ministry of Labor focus- 
es only on the work load immediately prior to  the employee's 
death.7s 
On the whole, Japanese labor unions have not zealously 
addressed the problems raised by karoshi. In fact, the labor 
unions have contributed to the problem because they often join 
management in legitimizing the conditions leading to overwork 
by entering into saburoku k ~ o t e i . ~ ~  The structure of 
k a i s h a s h ~ g i ~ ~  has led the unions to identify their members' 
collective interests with the prosperity and growth of their 
kaisha. They have therefore cooperated with management to 
make the success of their kaisha a high priority. In addition, 
the unions realize that lifetime employment structurally 
requires dependence on overtime as a buffer against any even- 
tual economic pressure for layoffs.76 
Japanese employees work extremely hard and thereby 
expose themselves to the dangers of karoshi for a variety of 
reasons. A fundamental explanation is the prevalence of 
kaishashugi, which fosters and requires the strong identifica- 
tion of workers with their kaisha. The above-mentioned 1991 
survey reports that 24.8% of the respondents ascribed the pri- 
mary cause of karoshi to voluntary overwork and forty-three 
percent to the overwork demanded by the worker's k a i ~ h a . ~ ~  
Voluntary overwork may involve the workers' self-interested 
pursuit of a higher income and promotion. But their self inter- 
ests alone cannot give the full explanation because a consider- 
able part of voluntary overwork is sabisu zangyo, unpaid and 
unrecorded overtime. For a deeper explanation, therefore, we 
must look to the workers' loyalty to their kaisha, which derives 
from their identification with the kaisha. Demanded overwork, 
72. Id. at 77. 
73. KAROSHI, supra note 33, at 89-97. 
74. Id. at 77-80; OSAMU WATANABE, YUTAKANA SHARAI NEION NO KOU) [THE 
STRUCTURE OF JAPAN AS AN AFFLUENT &lCIETY] 26 (1990). 
75. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
76. See genemlly Yamaguchi, supm note 62, at 45. For a criticism of this "buff- 
er theory," see KAROSHI, supra note 33, at 70-72. 
77. See Health Survey, supra note 52. 
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on the other hand would not be as prevalent without the gener- 
al practice of reinforcing this identification. Workers pressured 
to overwork would be willing and able to "get out of the rat 
race" by switching jobs if they had no strong sense of belonging 
to their kaisha and if other kaisha were less exclusive or less 
discriminatory to those freely moving workers who have no 
such sense of loyalty. 
Exposure to the danger of karoshi is itself a violation of 
individual rights, but i t  only symbolizes a more general and 
extensive undermining of individual rights by kaishashugi. 
Yagi's analogy of contemporary Japanese workers to slaves 
cannot be brushed aside as mere rhetoric. 
I must hasten to add, however, that this corporate slavery 
is not a classical capitalist exploitation imposed on workers. It 
is part of the social structure that has been widely (though 
with increasing ambivalence) accepted as a pillar of the com- 
mon interest by those enslaved. For example, an individual 
employee who refuses overtime work to spend more time with 
his family o r  on personal pursuits would be censured as 
wagamama (selfish) not only by his boss, but also by his col- 
l e a g u e ~ . ~ ~  The boss is in the same, or even a worse, situation 
due t o  his heavier load of responsibility. The collective interests 
of the kaisha community take precedence over an individual 
worker's right t o  lead the kind of life that enables him to situ- 
ate his identity and seek self-fulfillment outside his kaisha. 
As discussed earlier, karoshi is different from any of the 
three types of suicide discussed by Durkheim because it is not 
literally suicide.79 Moreover, karoshi has no resemblance to 
what Durkheim presents as the Japanese examples of altruistic 
suicide, such as the samurais' disembowelment (harakiri) and 
the collective suicide by "the sectarians of Amida."80 
Durkheim argues that these deeds share such motivations as 
hypersensitivity to insult, contempt for "clinging to life," re- 
78. Tabata, supm note 31, at 45, reports the case of a worker who was cen- 
sured as taihenna wagamama (very selfish) by his colleagues and the labor union 
because he refused the request for tanshin funin (job transfer without his wife's ac- 
companiment). According to a 1992 survey, more than 5Wo of the questioned work- 
ers replied that they felt hesitation in going home from work earlier than their 
colleagues who are working overtime. 'Kaishushugi' Aikuwarazu rKaishashugi' Re- 
mains Preualent], NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, Aug. 15, 1992, at 4 (quoting a survey by 
Nihon Risachi Soken [Japan Research Institute]). 
79. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text. 
80. DURKHEIM, supra note 46, at 222-25. 
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ligious fanaticism, and superstitions with other practices of 
optional altruistic suicide "associated with the most fundamen- 
tal moral characteristics of lower s~cieties."~~ Karoshi has 
nothing to do with these motivations. 
At a deeper level, however, karoshi has something in com- 
mon with altruistic suicide. Durkheim's insight into the funda- 
mental sociological cause of the latter also reveals the cause of 
the former. In both cases, a person takes a road leading to 
death because "society holds him in too strict tutelage" and 
because he is captured in a state "where the ego is not its own 
property, where it is blended with something not itself, where 
the goal of conduct is exterior to  itself, that is, in one of the 
groups in which it  participate^.'"^ 
Karoshi, therefore, is not an isolated personal tragedy. Just 
as egoistic and anomic suicides symbolize the anxiety and de- 
spair of the individualistic society, karoshi symbolizes the ten- 
sion and distress of a hyperindustrialized and secularized 
communitarian society, not of a primitive and religious commu- 
nity. It symbolizes the deep-seated dilemma of contemporary 
Japanese society-a society that has experienced what Baba 
calls "an exquisite combination of capitalistic competition with 
communal or socialistic  relation^."^^ 
This dilemma can aptly be so called, for human dimensions 
of life in contemporary Japan have been impoverished by the 
very same social regimentation that has brought about the 
success of Japanese society-its miraculous growth into a 
keizai taikoku, or economic world power. This dilemma over- 
shadows the lives of ordinary men and women who have been 
lucky enough not to meet karoshi or its concomitant family 
tragedy, as well as those who have not been so fortunate. 
81. Id. at 222-23. 
82. Id. at 221. 
83. Baba, supra note 41, at 71. 
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C. Tyranny of Intermediary Communities 
Awareness of this dilemma is increasing in Japan.84 The 
labor front, business circles and the government are now jointly 
discussing necessary legal reforms in the area of working 
hours.85 The issue, however, is deeper and broader than the 
mere length of working hours. It is deeper because what must 
now be examined and changed is the structure of kaishashugi 
itself. Unless the excessive communal cohesion of kaisha is 
loosened, Japan's society will not stop reproducing corporate 
persons or corporate warriors whose individual lives are impov- 
erished and deformed. The issue is broader than the number of 
working hours because kaishashugi is only one specific, al- 
though dominant, embodiment of the more general 
communitarian character of Japanese society. 
I t  should be pointed out that Japan, like other industrial- 
ized countries, indeed has its own share of unencumbered indi- 
viduals who do not feel constrained by communitarian norms. 
But Japanese society is basically an intricate web of various 
intermediary communities, each of which has a tenacious hold 
on the lives of its individual members and a relatively strong 
group autonomy vis-a-vis the state, as evidenced by the ability 
of these groups to maintain their internal order by extralegal 
and informal sanctions.86 Each community fosters group 
84. Id. at  78-80; WATANABE, supra note 74, at 9-42, 371-76; Komago, supra 
note 31; Nihonjin to Kaisha Tokubetsu Shuzaihan [Special Reporting Group on 
"The Japanese and Corporations"], Nihonjin to Kaishu, Dai-4Bu: Hokaisuru Kyodo 
Genso [The Japanese and Corporations, Part 4: The Common Illusion Shuttered], 
serially published in NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, Aug. 6-8, 10, 11, 1991, respectively at 
1; TATSUO INOUE, ET AL., KYOSEI HEN0 BOKEN [AN EXPMRATION FOR A CONVIVIAL 
SOCIJiTY] 8-35 (1992). 
85. Zadankai: Jitansokushinho no Roso [Symposium: Conceptions of Working 
Hours Curtailment Law], JURISUM, Apr. 1, 1992, at 10-42. Symposium contributors 
re~resented business circles. the labor front. and the Ministw of Labor. 
86. Haley has recently examined this structure of Japanese society and its 
relation to law in a sober historical and sociological analysis. See HALEY, supra 
note 35. He came to the following conclusion: 
For better or for worse, therefore, Japan is a society ordered more by 
extralegal and o h n  quite coercive community and group controls than 
law or government power . . . . The state remains active and interven- 
tionist, but its capacity to control or maintain order depends ultimately 
upon its ability to persuade and cajole in order to achieve consensus. In 
this context law and the formal mechanisms of law enforcement function 
more as tools for consensus building and leverage than coercive instru- 
ments of state control. 
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loyalty, collective identity, and a sense of responsibility for 
mutual care among its members, but tends to narrow and ho- 
mogenize the members' mental horizons and to apply the per- 
vasive pressure of social tyranny on deviant individuals, who 
seek a form of life different from the community's shared life- 
style.87 
Id. a t  200. 
The only real antagonists to [this system] are those who seek either a 
concentration of power or its even greater diffusion through personal, 
individual empowerment-goals that, from the example of the concomitant 
rise of individualism and state power in  the West, are not as inconsistent 
a s  they may a t  first appear. 
Id. at 190-91. In other words, the "power brokers of contemporary Japan are those 
who can manipulate best the community sanctions and the informal, consensual 
levers of coercion, however peripheral they may be in terms of Japan's hierarchical 
concentration of authority a t  the center." Id. a t  191. 
87. Yoichi Higuchi, When Society is Itself the Tyrant, 35 JAPAN Q., 0ct.-Dec. 
1988, a t  350, 354. Higuchi, one of the leading constitutional lawyers in  Japan, 
forcefully argues the point in the following passage: 
Mill insisted on the importance of "a limit to the legitimate interference 
of collective opinion with individual independence." One hundred and 
thirty years later in  Japan, freedom from political authority (the state) 
has come to  receive wide support. Freedom from societal authority, on the 
other hand, tends to be offset by theories about the rights of juridical 
persons and a "segmented society" [i.e. intermediary association]. The 
former recognizes juridical persons (potential bearers of vast societal au- 
thority) and natural persons (staunch resisters of such authority) as  equal 
bearers of human rights, thus opening the door to legal countenance of 
oppression against decisions based on the will of the individual. The theo- 
ry of a segmented society, meanwhile, by seeking self-discipline of groups 
[in other words, group autonomy], abandons the possibility of aid through 
the courts in the solution of intrasegmental disputes [in other words, dis- 
putes within an intermediary association]. 
I t  would seem that within the social relationships that exist before a 
dispute ever reaches court, most Japanese fear becoming true individuals, 
each with his or her unique opinion, and instead bury all differences in 
the majority opinion . . . . In  schools those who rebel against picayune 
rules restricting student clothing and hair styles are treated as  heretics, 
while at  the office workers are expected to become "company men" who 
devote themselves above all to their work, a t  whatever wst to their per- 
sonal lives. All of these phenomenon are direct expressions of the wide- 
spread tendency to smother individuality. 
Id. at 354 (comments in brackets are the author's). 
Haley quotes part of the same passage and substantiates it with some exam- 
ples of the dark side of communal controls in Japan that are often hidden by the 
'tision of Japan as  a society dominated by closely knit, interdependent communi- 
ties and carefully cultivated, mutually supportive interpersonal networks enveloped 
in the rhetoric of harmony." HALEY, supra note 35, a t  183-84. For a survey of 
theories about segmented societies (bubunshahiron), see Koji Sato, Ho, Kenryoku, 
Shakai: 'Bubunshakniron' ni Yosete [Law, Power and Society: Toward 'the Theory of 
Subsocieties'], in LII GENDAI HOTETSUGAKU: JITTEIHO NO KISORIRON [3 CONTEMPO- 
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This social structure has proved its remarkable efficiency 
in mobilizing people to attain collective goals, such as economic 
growth, without extensively resorting to legal coercion backed 
by state power. But the cost for this structure has also been 
great in terms of individual rights. In addition to the right to 
life, of which karoshi victims have been deprived, the right to 
individual autonomy and dignity have been callously neglected 
simply because the group autonomy of intermediary communi- 
ties has been so respected that state power, including that of 
the judiciary, has rarely interfered with community practices 
that violate individual rights. 
A case in point is Tanaka v. Hitachi, Inc.,8' in which the 
Japanese Supreme Court held that the management and labor 
union of a hisha  can jointly force an individual employee to 
work beyond the legal (if not mandatory) limit of working 
hours, even against his will. This is only one of many exam- 
ples. Japan's Supreme Court has also allowed a kaisha to dis- 
criminate against an individual in employment on the basis of 
his political beliefss9 and allowed a kaisha to make a political 
donation in its corporate capacity.g0 
But kaisha are not the only types of intermediary commu- 
nities that enjoy such strong group autonomy. In the matter of 
religious freedom, group autonomy is also given priority over 
individual rights. In 1988, the Japanese Supreme Court dis- 
missed a Christian woman's compensation and injunction 
claims against the Veteran's Association (VA) and the Self- 
Defense Forces (SDF). Despite her explicit and repeated refus- 
al, the VA and SDF had jointly arranged to enshrine her late 
husband, an SDF serviceman killed in an accident while on 
duty, in a Shinto shrine. The Court based its decision partly on 
the ground that the constitutionally protected freedom of reli- 
RARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: FOUNDATIONAL TI-JEORLES OF THE POSITIVE LAW] 351-84 
(Ryuichi Nagao & Shigeaki Tanaka eds., 1983). Here Koji Sato, another influential 
constitutional lawyer in Japan, gives an ambivalent appraisal to bubunshakuimn. 
He sympathizes with its pluralistic element which relativizes the state sovereignty 
and reinforces the hedom of association, but warns against its tendency to leave 
unchecked the violation of individual rights by intermediary associations. Id. at  
352-58, 369-74. 
88. Judgment of Nov. 28, 1991, Saik6sai Daiichi Shohotei [Supreme Court, 1st 
Petty Bench], 774 HANTA 73 (Japan). 
89. Judgment of Dec. 12, 1973 (Takano v. Mitsubishi Jushi, Inc.), Saik6sai 
Daihotei [Supreme Court, Grand Bench] 724 HANJI 18 (Japan). 
90. Judgment of June 24, 1970 (Arita v. Kojima), Saik6sai Daihotei [Supreme 
Court, Grand Bench] 597 HANJI 3 (Japan). 
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giongl implied that she, as an individual, had a duty to show 
"tolerance" for the religious freedom of the Shinto shrine.92 
Neighborhood communities, which once prospered as the 
lower reaches of government in prewar and wartime Japan, 
have generally become less pervasive in terms of their influ- 
ence on everyday life, partly because of the population's in- 
creased mobility. But there still remains a strong national 
consciousness that neighbors should maintain communal rela- 
tionships (mutual aid and amicability) with each other and that 
the law should not interfere with those relationships. This con- 
sciousness sometimes comes out in an explosive way, as it did 
in the so-called rinjin sosho (neighborhood litigation) incident 
in Suzuka City, Mie Prefe~ture.'~ 
In 1977, a couple living in a Suzuka suburb filed a damage 
suit against their neighbors because the couple's three-year-old 
son drowned in an irrigation pond while being tended for a 
brief time by the neighbors. The accident happened after the 
neighbors let the plaintiffs son play outside with their own 
four-year-old son without any adult supervision. In 1983, the 
Tsu District Court deemed both sides negligent and, according 
to the comparative negligence laws, awarded the plaintiffs 
about five million yen.94 
The media reported the case using headlines that were 
critical of the award, such as "Judgment Hard on Kind Neigh- 
bor~.'*~ The media reports triggered formidable forces of social 
tyranny against the  plaintiff^.'^ The plaintiffs received ap- 
91. Kenpa [Constitution] art. XX (Japan). 
92. Judgment of June 1, 1988 (Kuni v. Nakaya), Saik6sai Daihotei [Supreme 
Court, Grand Bench] 1277 Hanji 34 (Japan). Commenting on this decision, Higuchi 
says, "Majority opinions that treat a shrine's freedom of religion as equivalent to 
that of the plaintiff, and require the exercise of mutual tolerance,' actually give 
the shrine's rights precedence over those of individuals." Higuchi, supm note 87, at  
354. 
93. This incident shocked the general public as well as jurists and was exten- 
sively discussed in law journals and other publications in Japan. See, e.g., RINJIN 
MSHO TO HO NO YAKUWARI [THE NEIGHBORHOOD LITIGATION AM) THE ROLE OF 
LAW] (Eiichi Hoshino ed., 1984) [hereinafter RINJIN]; TAKESHI KO= ET AL., 
RINJIN MSHO NO KENRN [A STClDY OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD L~TIGATION] (1989). 
For a detailed bibliography, see id. at 252-54. 
94. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1983 (Yamanaka v. Kondo), Chisai [District Court], 
495 HANTA 64 (Japan) reprinted in RINJIN, supra note 93, at 204-33. The court 
found that the plaintiffs were 70% negligent. Id. 
95. MAnvrcm SHINBUN (Tokyo), Feb. 25, 1983 (evening ed.), at 15; see also 
KOJIMA ET AL., supra note 93, at 243-44. 
96. RINJIN, supra note 93, at 120-36, 193-97; KOJIMA ET AL., supm note 93, at  
14-16, 243-44; HALEY, supm note 35, at  114. 
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proximately six hundred phone calls and three hundred letters 
within the following week. Most of the letters and calls were 
anonymous and included accusations and threats, such as "Are 
you using your dead boy to make money?"; "Devils!"; "Do you 
want me to set fire to your house?"; and so forth. Moreover, the 
dead boy's father was fired from his subcontracted plumbing 
job the day after the judgment. The boy's mother was denied 
service by shopkeepers in the neighborhood and his older sister 
was teased at school. 
Crushed by all of this, the plaintiffs offered to withdraw 
their To curb this alarming reaction, the Ministry of 
Justice issued a very unusual announcement stating, in effect, 
that the threats and insults made against the plaintiffs were a 
very regrettable violation of their constitutionally protected 
right of access to the courts?' The Ministry emphasized the 
importance of this right and stated that it should never be 
violated in this way again." While the propriety of this par- 
ticular litigation is quite the litigation and 
its aftermath clearly demonstrate how easily the virtues of a 
neighborhood community can turn into cruel intolerance and 
social tyranny in a country where respect for individual rights 
has no important place in its shared traditions. 
Schools must also be mentioned here, not only because 
they are a seedbed for communal cohesion in other social 
spheres, but also because they are themselves an important 
type of intermediary community whose group autonomy takes 
precedence over individual rights. Japanese schools have been 
effective in raising the average achievement of the country's 
children. But this effectiveness is at least partly due to the fact 
that many schools strive to control children's lives literally 
"from head to toe" by meticulous school regulations and disci- 
pline, sometimes including corporal punishment. The repressed 
and frustrated children often vent their discontent by persis- 
tent group harassment of certain target children (gime). This 
97. When it was reported that the defendants refused to agree to the plaintiffs' 
withdrawal, they were also harassed by anonymous calls and letters, though to a 
lesser extent. Eventually the defendants agreed and the decision was nulltfied. See 
RINJIN, supra note 93, at 121-22; KOJIMA ET AL., supm note 93, at 15. 
98. Ken@ [Constitution] art. XXXII (Japan). 
99. The Ministry of Justice's full statement is  quoted in RINJIN, supra note 93, 
at 234; KOJIMA ET At., supra note 93, at 15-16. 
100. For discussions on this issue, see RINJIN, supm note 93, at 65-129, 165-93; 
KOJIMA ET AL., supra note 93, at 35-86, 174-212. 
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treatment, combined with the smothering school control, has 
driven a number of children into prolonged absence (toko kyohi) 
or even suicide due to school-phobia.lol 
In Kumamoto Prefecture, a public junior high school stu- 
dent defied a school regulation that required close-cropped 
haircuts of all male students. Because of his defiance, he was 
harassed by his classmates and treated as a troublemaker by 
his teachers and schoolmaster. His parents, who supported 
their son's act of defiance, were heckled by parents of other 
students a t  a PTA meeting with disparaging phrases such as 
"egoists," "mean," and "get out of town!" 
The student and his parents sued the schoolmaster and the 
town for compensation and sought a declaration that the school 
regulation was a nullity on the constitutional grounds of equal- 
ity under the law,lo2 freedom of expression10S and due 
process.104 But in 1985, the Kumamoto District Court recog- 
nized the schoolmaster's broad discretion regarding proper 
educational measures and dismissed the plaintiffs7 claims.lo5 
These examples all show that individual rights are an 
endangered moral species in the land of community. They are 
chronically endangered by the overgrowth and overprotection of 
intermediary communities. There is an urgent need to save 
individual rights because the consequence of their atrophy is 
that human lives in Japan are now being impoverished, devas- 
tated, and even destroyed. 
Karoshi exemplifies this need by revealing the human 
tragedies imposed on individuals by kaisha, the most vigorous 
and dominant form of intermediary community in contempo- 
rary Japan.lOG Karoshi vividly illustrates that the gap be- 
tween collective prosperity of intermediary communities and 
individual fulfillment of human beings is deepening and widen- 
101. See generally TERUHISA HORIO ET AL., 43 JURISUTO mKAN %IGO TOKUSHU: 
KODOMO NO JINKEN [43 JURISUTO SUPPLEMENTARY FEATURE ISSUE: CHILDREN'S 
HUMAN RIGHTS] 64-124, 211-19, 230-43 (1986); Koji Sato et al., Tokushu: Kodomo 
no Jinken [Symposium on Children's Human Rights], 38 JNU TO SEIGI 2-74 (1987). 
102. KENW [Constitution] art. XIV (Japan). 
103. Id art. XXI. 
104. Id art. XXXI. 
105. Judgment of Nov. 13, 1985 (Shino v. Gyokuto-Machi), Kumamoto C h i d  
[District Court of Kumamoto], 570 HANTA 33 (Japan). 
106. Karoshi victims also include people other than company employees, such as 
school teachers and civil servants. The structures of human relationships that con- 
nect and integrate them in their offices seem to be similar to those found in 
hisha (although I cannot analyze them in this article). 
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ing. Japanese society has enjoyed a strong communal cohesion 
and efficiency in the pursuit of collective goals because people 
have been led to believe in the promised harmony between an 
individual's happiness and the collective prosperity of the com- 
.munity to which he belongs. But it is now becoming clearer to 
many that this promised harmony is not being fulfilled. 
The ultimate sense in which karoshi is a symbolic death of 
contemporary Japanese society is this: it shows that Japan's 
moral infrastructure is worn out and that society needs a moral 
reorientation which places a greater emphasis on individual 
rights. 
IV. RIGHTS AS A BASIS FOR OPEN COMMUNALITY 
Reorientation toward individual rights does not necessitate 
the sacrifice of all the positive aspects of human communality 
to individualism. Rather, the Japanese experience shows that 
individual rights are needed in order to enjoy a richer form of 
human communality. The tyranny of intermediary communities 
impoverishes both the communal and individual dimensions of 
human existence. 
Kaishashugi is again a good example in this regard. I t  
confines individuals t o  a small and narrow segment of human 
communal life and thereby incapacitates them for the fuller 
participation in the community. If an individual gives himself 
wholly to a kaisha, he has almost nothing left to give to, or 
share with, other people in other spheres of social life, 
The life and death of Yagi, who presented the poignant 
"slave" analogy in his note, show how kaishashugi can destroy 
Japanese workers' family lives.lo7 Deprived of "the right t o  sit 
down a t  the dinner table with their families," they not only 
give up "the simplest of pleasures those forced laborers of ages 
past enjoyed," but also relinquish one of their most important 
communal responsibilities-the responsibility to share life with 
their families.los If workers cannot fulfill even their family re- 
sponsibilities, they can much less afford to care about the pub- 
lic affairs of their local communities and other civic responsibil- 
ities. The prevalent apathy and cynicism toward politics, illus- 
trated by low voter turnouts and lack of power change in Japa- 
nese society, are partly due to the fact that the ordinary 
107. See KAROSHI, supra note 33, at 37-46. 
108. Id. at 4. 
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workers' participatory energy and sense of social responsibility 
are absorbed by their kaisha. The narrowing of their social 
horizon by kaishashugi is aptly criticized by a popular pun-like 
slogan calling for attitudinal reorientation: "F'rom kaisha 
ningen to shakai ningen" (from the corporate person to the 
social person).log 
I t  may sound like a paradox to say that human communal- 
ity is impoverished, not by individualism, but by a certain 
communal structure in Japan. However, the apparent paradox 
disappears once we understand the multiplicity of human com- 
munality. Our communality flourishes in its fullness only if we 
foster and sustain our multiple memberships in the different 
layers or spheres of our communal life: first, family and 
friends; second, occupational, religious and various voluntary 
associations; and, finally, local, ethnic, national, and global 
communities. 
People who berate individualism for corroding human com- 
munality are prone to overlook or minimize the conflict be- 
tween the different spheres of communal life. If a certain group 
in a certain sphere penetrates and dominates the whole person- 
ality of its members, it makes them indifferent or even hostile 
to the other spheres of human communality. A group's strong 
internal cohesion allows its members to foster interdependence, 
attachment, responsibility for mutual care and other communal 
virtues only among themselves. These pitfalls of kaishashugi 
can have their equivalent in any of the other intermediary 
communities. Some devout religious sectarians, for example, 
may turn their backs on any communal relationships and re- 
sponsibilities outside those of their own denomination. "Meism" 
and narcissism are not exclusively individualistic maladies; 
there are communal versions of these diseases that may be 
more intractably antisocial. 
The state in which the multiple potentialities of our human 
communality are well developed and balanced may be called 
open communality as opposed to the closed communality found 
in the collectively narcissistic groups described above. Open 
communality is sounder and richer than closed communality, 
but it is also more vulnerable if put in competition with the 
latter. To sustain it, we need a moral sense of balance. We 
have to balance our moral lives so as not to  give too much of 
109. Sato e t  al., supra note 101, at 32. 
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ourselves to any particular communal sphere. We need to keep 
o u r  individuality separate from any specific communal sphere 
in order to strengthen our overall communality. 
Respect for individual rights is essential to a moral envi- 
ronment in which we are able to cultivate this sense of balance 
for three reasons. First, the concept of individual rights entails 
universalism because it requires one to respect all individuals. 
The universalism of rights has both normative and meta-ethi- 
cal components. The normative component consists of justice, 
fairness, equality, fundamental human rights, and so forth. I t  
opens our eyes to the need to give due consideration to each of 
the conflicting responsibilities we owe to different individuals 
with whom we are related in different communal spheres, with- 
out exhausting ourselves by emphasizing one responsibility in 
disregard of others. Although Gilligan considers an ethic of care 
to be the opposite of an ethic of rights,l1° in reality the former 
presupposes the latter. An ethic of care requires sensitivity to 
conflicts of responsibilities. But we could not keep this sensitiv- 
ity unless we were committed to the belief that all the individ- 
uals to whom we may have conflicting responsibilities have a 
right to due consideration. It is this belief that should prevent 
us from blindly favoring just one of our responsibilities of care 
to the detriment of the others. 
The meta-ethical component consists of commitment to  the 
universal acceptability of one's own principles, which in turn 
entails openness to criticism from outsiders. The meta-ethical 
component gives us critical leverage for transcending the kind 
of dominant convention that embodies the very narrow, exclu- 
sive, and exhausting group-centeredness of a particular commu- 
nity. 
Second, the concept of individual rights requires us to 
respect individuals as individuals. Individualism of rights in- 
cludes a trump function that gives individuals a veto over the 
collective goals of their community. However, we need not in- 
terpret this veto in the absolutist sense that Glendon critically 
ascribes to the current American rights talk-which allows us 
to disregard collective goals and general interests.''' In fact, 
Ronald Dworkin, one of Glendon's targets,'* gives us a more 
110. GILLIGAN, supra note 14, at 19. 
111. See generally GLENDON, supra note 4, ch. 2. 
112. Id. at40. 
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relaxed non-absolutist interpretation of individualism when he  
says: 
The strength of a particular right, within a particular theory, 
is a function of the degree of disservice to the goals of the 
theory, beyond a mere disservice on the whole, that is neces- 
sary to justify refusing an act called for under the right. In 
the popular political theory apparently prevailing in the Unit- 
ed States, for example, individuals have rights to free public 
speech on political matters and to a certain minimum stan- 
dard of living, but neither right is absolute and the former i s  
much stronger than the latter.Il3 
According to Dworkin's interpretation, the point of individ- 
ual rights is not to allow a n  individual to do whatever disser- 
vice to the collective goals he likes, but to set a limit to the 
degree of service to the collective goals which he cannot refuse. 
Even a stronger right is not absolute in the sense that the right 
holder can refuse any degree of service to the collective goals in 
the name of that right. However, a n  individual can refuse some 
degree of that service as long as he has a right. 
Dworkin's "goals of the theory" are those of a political 
theory. The collective goals he has in mind are those of political 
community-a community with organized coercive power. The 
formal structure of rights described here can and should be 
generalized to cover the relationship between rights and the 
collective goals of nonpolitical communities because nonpolitical 
communities can also threaten or violate their individual 
members' rights by various informal pressures. 
Interpreted this way, the trump function of rights is indis- 
pensable to a moral sense of balance. I t  does not blind an  indi- 
vidual to the collective goals or interests of various communi- 
ties. Rather, i t  enables him to participate in  various communal 
. pursuits in various spheres which he thinks worthwhile by 
refusing to dedicate the whole of himself to the collective pur- 
suits of a particular group. 
Lastly, individualism of rights not only enables but also 
motivates us to develop our communality. It is our sense of our 
own individual dignity that  leads us to appreciate the same 
worth of the individuality of other persons. While diagnosing 
113. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 169-70 (1977) (emphasis add- 
ed). 
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the maladies of individualism, Durkheim also gave a penetrat- 
ing insight into this moral power of individualism: 
The fact is stressed that the motives of certain altruistic sui- 
cides reappear in slightly different forms as the basis of ac- 
tions regarded by everyone as moral. ~ u t  is egoistic suicide 
any different? Has not the sentiment of individual autonomy 
its own morality as well as  the opposite sentiment? If the 
latter serves as foundation to a kind of courage, strengthening 
and even hardening the heart, the other softens and moves it 
to pity. Where altruistic suicide is prevalent, man is always 
ready to give his life; however, at  the same time, he sets no 
more value on that of another. On the contrary, when he 
rates individual personality above all other ends, he respects 
it in others. His cult for it makes him suffer from all that 
minimizes it even among his fellows. A broader sympathy for 
human suffering succeeds the fanatical devotions of primitive 
times.l14 
By way of comparison, it may be noted here that Gilligan 
acknowledges the "right to include oneself in the compass of a 
morality of responsibility" and the need to give moral weight 
both to "the sense of concern for another human being and your 
sense of concern for yourself."115 Accordingly, the ultimate 
task of a morality of responsibility, or an ethic of care, is to 
resolve the conflict of responsibilities to care for oneself and 
other persons. GiUigan believes that human moral maturity 
consists in carrying out this task.'l6 
But Durkheim looks at a deeper truth: only by keeping our 
sense of the worth of our individual existence can we maintain 
our sense of concern for others. The belief in individual rights 
by which we can refuse to abandon ourselves to "the fanatical 
devotions" to collective goals is the real basis for "a broader 
114. DURKHEIM, supra note 46, at 240. 
115. GILUGAN, supra note 14, at 134. 
116. Id at 151-74. 
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sympathy for human s~f'fering."~~' This is another sense in 
which an ethic of care presupposes an ethic of rights. 
In summary, communitarians urge that the liberal belief in 
individual rights impoverishes our communal life and human 
agency. But the Japanese experience presented in this article 
shows that this is at  most a half-truth and only applicable to a 
misguided version of rights talk. The closed community that 
neglects individual rights and absorbs its members' personality 
117. This view seems to complement the conception of liberal community that 
Ronald Dworkin recently presented in his Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479, 
499-504 (1989). The liberal community, in his view, consists of "liberal civic repub- 
licans" or "integrated citizens." Each "accepts that the value of his own life de- 
pends on the success of his community in treating everyone with equal concern." 
Id. at  501. Therefore, an individual's value depends on whether the rights of other 
citizens as well as his own are duly protected. They "know that they win or lose 
together." Id. at 502. Dworkin concedes that this liberal vision of community is 
utopian, but in the following statements he gives a reason "why people should ac- 
cept integration in the liberal sense, why they should regard the success of their 
lives as dependent . . . on the justice of their community's political decisions." Id. 
Someone lives well when he responds appropriately to his circumstances. 
The ethical question is not how should human beings live, but how 
should someone in my position live? A great deal turns, therefore, on how 
my position is to be defined, and it seems compelling that justice should 
figure in the description. The ethical question becomes: what is a good 
life for someone entitled to the share of resources I am entitled to 
have? . . . Someone does pro tanto a poorer job of living-responds pro 
tanto more poorly to his circumstances-if he acts unjustly. . . . Perhaps 
the great lives of some artists would not have been possible in a fully 
just society, and it would not follow that they had bad lives. But it does 
follow that it counts against the goodness of any life, even theirs, that it 
was supported by injustice. 
Id. at  503. 
But what if I do not have more nor less than, but just as much as the share 
of resources I am entitled to? What if the misery of the people victimized by an 
unjust practice prevails because some others' lives, not mine, are supported by that 
practice? Does it follow that I would not have to care a bit about their misery? I 
do not think Dworkin would say yes. The a f f i i t i v e  answer implies that I can be 
indifferent to the misery of others as long as I am not involved in the injustice 
which brings it about-as long as my own hands are clean. This does not fit 
Dworkin's conception of the community of integrated liberals. But his argument 
given above does not seem to prevent us  from accepting this conclusion. So it 
seems to me that "a broader sympathy for human suffering," to which our sense of 
the worth of individual personality commits us, gives a simpler and stronger 
ground for his vision of a liberal community. I t  is true that the range of liberal 
integration in question is narrower than this sympathy-it is confined to the politi- 
cal community (the state). But this could be explained by the fact that our ability 
to make common political decisions is still basically limited to the territory of our 
state in the present world order. 
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also impoverishes our communal life, as well as  our individual- 
ity. Adequately conceived individual rights based on universal- 
ism, a non-absolutist trump function and a sense of the worth 
of individuality are the bases for a richer form of communali- 
ty-namely, open communality. This form of communality 
activates and widens our sensitivity to the wide range of our 
communal responsibilities. In other words, individual rights 
can sustain the delicate equilibrium of various competing com- 
munities by checking the overgrowth of each of them. In this 
sense, the tension between rights and community is indispens- 
able to their reconciliation. 
